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Abstract: The paper analyzes economic evaluations by distinguishing evaluative statements from
value judgments proper. Building on this basis, it compares four solutions to the value-neutrality
problem in economics. After rebutting the strong theses about neutrality (normative economics is
illegitimate) and non-neutrality (the social sciences are value-impregnated), the paper settles the case
between the weak neutrality thesis (common in welfare economics) and a novel, weak non-neutrality
thesis that extends the realm of normative economics more widely than the other weak thesis does.
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1. Introduction
Suppose that a sample of economists is asked whether or not A makes a value
judgment, where A ranges over the following claims: "The more equal the income
distribution, the more just it is", "In terms of the Gini coefficient, the income
distribution of most countries is less unequal than the distribution of wealth", "People
with less than 5$ a day are in a state of poverty". We may expect a virtually
unanimous yes-answer in the first case, a widely shared no-answer in the second, and
divided answers in the third. This pattern would be likely to be roughly similar if the
poll were carried out with, say, "There is no good allocation that is Pareto-
dominated", "In terms of the Pareto criterion, allocation x is superior to allocation y",
and "Competitive markets are efficient". As the imaginary experiment suggests, the
profession's ideas about what counts as a value judgment and what does not are far
from being unstructured, but also leave room for disagreement. One goal of the
present paper is to develop a conceptual framework in which those divergent
opinions can be restated and assessed.
But why is the question about value judgments at all interesting? Does it really
matter what classifications economists make in their reflective moments, as opposed
to the work they actually perform? There is a quick answer to this worry. It is
important to be clear about how judgments of value are to be distinguished from
other judgments because it serves as a logical step towards resolving the so-called
value neutrality problem, which any thoughtful economist should arguably be
concerned with. This is the problem of deciding whether it is possible, and, if so,
whether it is desirable, for economists not to make value judgments in their
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2professional work - as opposed to the value judgments they are welcome to make in
their private life and the political arena. (To convey the restriction to professional
work, I will use the convenient saying "the economist qua economist".) The stakes
attached to the neutrality problem are so heavy and visible that the profession has
long recognized them, even to the point of exaggeration. Not a few economists take
for granted the positivist tenet that only mathematical and factual judgments, not
value judgments, are amenable to rational discussion. Sen (1970, ch. 5) and others
have fought against this crude claim, and replaced it with the weaker one that there
are marked differences, both logical and rhetorical, between the three classes of
judgments. If this is indeed the case, one's vision of economics cannot be the same
whether one construes it as a primarily neutral or primarily non-neutral discipline.
No more than Sen's weak claim is needed in order to justify the present investigation
into value judgments and value neutrality.
Section 2 sketches four theses that can conveniently be located along an axis - strong
neutrality, weak neutrality, weak non-neutrality, and strong non-neutrality. Sections
3 and 4 do some groundwork on economic evaluations and prescriptions; these
sections are purposefully brief, and several details will have to await another, more
technical paper. Building on this basis, section 5 investigates evaluative concepts of
economics such as goodness, justice, and preference, then section 6 swiftly rebuts the
strong theses about the neutrality and non-neutrality of economics. The end of the
paper settles the case between the non-extreme theses, a sophisticated task that
crucially depends on the groundwork. Section 7 reexamines the classic distinction,
due to Weber and taken up by Robbins, between making a value judgment and taking
it as an object of study, and section 8 discusses the related distinction between ends
and means that Weber and Robbins also emphasized. These sections argue that the
first distinction is subject to difficulties, and the second essentially irrelevant to
economics. In view of the objections, the weak neutrality thesis remains devoid of
any supporting argument, and the ground is cleared for the weak non-neutrality
thesis; section 9 concludes that it provides the best answer to the value neutrality
problem.
2. Four theses about neutrality. A preview of the argument
Historically, theses about the neutrality or otherwise of economics entered the field
when Robbins (1932) borrowed his statement of the problem, and the language of
value overall, from Weber (1922).1 Before this continental shift, the tradition of
English-speaking economics had put forward internal divisions based on other
philosophical mottos, such as "science" versus "morals" or "ethics", and "is" versus
"ought". This earlier tradition culminated with John Neville Keynes's (1890) famous
trichotomy between the "positive science", the "normative science", and the "art" of
economics (the last being roughly what we now call applied economics). The very
first divisions, as in Senior and Mill, had been only twofold, contrasting Keynes's
first term with a mix of his last two, so that he deserves credit for introducing the
normative-positive cleavage into economics. Remarkably, Keynes's analysis was not
displaced by Robbins's imported Weberianism (even his Essay makes some use of
it). Subsequent debates have always been couched in both the language of value and
the positive-normative distinction – see, among others, Friedman (1953), Archibald
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3(1959), Lipsey (1963), Hutchison (1964), Machlup (1978, ch. 9).2 The implicit
connection is that a statement made by an economist counts as normative if it is
paired with a value judgment made by that economist (not somebody else), and that
the statement counts as positive otherwise (in particular, it may bear on somebody
else's value judgments). This is still today's received view, and it provides an
apparently definitive and clear-cut division of economics; thus I will refer to it as to
the authoritative criterion. A more focused paper on value neutrality would have
resulted if I could have avoided discussing also the positive versus the normative, but
the conceptual embroilment I just explained makes this strategy infeasible.
Accordingly, I will approach the value-neutrality problem also in terms of the
following classic questions. Is normative economics at all legitimate? If it is, should
it be demarcated from positive economics? And if it should, how could it be?
The value-neutrality problem has received three broad solutions in 20th century
economics. Thesis 1 bluntly claims that in their professional work, economists
should always refrain from making value judgments; it expresses the neutrality
position in the strongest possible way. Since a prohibition makes sense only if it is
possible to violate it, the thesis takes for granted that it is logically possible for the
economist qua economist to make value judgments. Using the authoritative criterion
as a translation device, one would re-express this by saying that economics either is
or ought to be positive (the case of "is" corresponding to situations in which the
question of making a value judgment does not logically arise, that of "ought" to
situations in which the prohibition applies). Quite remarkably, the strong neutrality
position has fostered conflicting assessments of welfare economics. A fierce
spokesman of the former, Robbins (1932) wanted to push the latter out of economics
into the limbo of "ethics"; however, his followers at the London School of
Economics (LSE) disagreed with him on this score. Archibald (1959) argued that
welfare economics was positive in the same sense as, say, unemployment theory, and
did not threaten the Robbinsian objective of an entirely neutral economic science;
hence, there was no point in dismissing it. Today, there is a formalistic account of
welfare economics, social choice theory, and related work such as bargaining theory,
that leads to a roughly similar conclusion, though by a different route. As the
argument goes, welfare economics and similar theories are positive in the sense not
of unemployment theory, but of mathematics and logic. It is not the factual or
empirical character of these theories, but their complete lack thereof, which
supposedly accounts for their neutrality.3
Thesis 2 expresses a weaker neutrality position. It starts from the same underlying
assumption that the question of making value judgments logically arises for the
economist qua economist, but it then claims, contrary to thesis 1, that there are
occasions in which he might, and even should, make these judgments. In the other
language, one would say that economics might and even ought to be normative
sometimes; otherwise, it is or ought to be positive, depending on the case. Beyond
these vague generalities, thesis 2 acquires its focus from what I call the containment
claim: those value judgments which economists have a right (and a fortiori an
obligation) to make are few in number, easy to discover, and logically as well as
practically separable from the other judgments that economists make. It is not
obvious how to recast this in terms of the positive-normative distinction, but it
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4certainly suggests that the authoritative criterion operates well in concrete situations.
Accordingly, I construe the containment claim as implying that, when effectively
applied, the authoritative criterion is both exhaustive and exclusive, as any good
criterion must be, and further, that it does not give rise to grossly counterintuitive
consequences. The new welfare economics in its heyday illustrates thesis 2 most
vividly. Bergson (1938), Samuelson (1947), and Little (1950) believed that they, and
other economists in the field, made, and were indeed justified in making, value
judgments. However, the latter were contained, in the sense of belonging to some
kind of standardized list. According to the universally shared value judgment, the
Pareto optimum was a particular concept of good, and Pareto-superiority a particular
concept of betterness. Then, the new welfare economists would take a stand as to
interpersonal comparisons of satisfaction, i.e., whether they should be made, and if
so, how (it was another tenet of the time that such comparisons needed value
judgments). Finally, there was a broad commitment towards distributional equality,
which the school would qualify in a number of ways.
The new welfare economists' analysis of Paretian concepts needs spelling out,
because it has become the established treatment in today's economics. They would
define Pareto optimality and superiority in terms of either preferences or ordinal
utilities, which belong to the individuals', not the observer's evaluations, so that by
the authoritative criterion, these counted as positive concepts. However, the new
welfare economists felt that they would not employ the Paretian apparatus, even qua
economists, unless they would invest it with "ethical" interest. Thus, they added to
the definitions a separable value judgment to connect the Pareto ordering with the
"economic" or "social" good. While endorsing the new welfare economists'
evaluative account of Paretianism, Arrow (1951) argues in effect that their list of
value judgments is too thin.4 He would like to include value judgments on collective
rationality, such as those accompanying the "independence of irrelevant alternatives"
(IIA) condition. There is a substantial disagreement here, but at the formal level at
which thesis 2 unfolds, nothing distinguishes Arrow from the economists he
criticizes. He applies to the novel condition the two-part analysis they apply to the
Pareto principle, i.e., he keeps his definition of IIA carefully separate from his value
judgment that rational groups should satisfy it. In the hands of many economists,
individual decision theory obeys a related pattern. For instance, they would define an
individual agent to be someone who maximizes an objective under an availability
constraint, and then normally add the value judgment that optimization is an essential
part of rationality.5
At the other end of the spectrum, thesis 3 denies that economists, whatever their
realm of activities, should refrain from making value judgments. In respect of values,
what they do qua economists is no different from what they do qua citizens or
private persons. The strong non-neutrality thesis often receives a corollary, to the
effect that value judgments should be made as openly as possible - what is wrong
with them is not that they are made, but that they usually remain swept under the
carpet. To support these and related claims, the common arguments are that the
neutrality recommendation would impoverish the field, that it cannot be feasibly
implemented, and even that it involves a logical impossibility. In terms of the
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5positive-normative distinction, one would say that economics either is or should be -
depending on which argument is selected - normative throughout. Contrary to the
other theses, this one was put forward not just for economics, but for the social
sciences generally, and in even more adventurous pronouncements, for knowledge
tout court. It reaches a climax with the claim that, when performing logical and
mathematical steps, the scientist is still evaluating something. Thesis 3 has always
been more prominent in the other social scientists' critiques of economics than within
the discipline itself. Those few economists who accept it are a fringe of self-
proclaimed heterodoxy, be they neo-Marxist, neo-Keynesian, or something else. As a
representative, I have selected Myrdal (1958), who belongs to the "something else",
because his claims are not directly political and belong to the metatheoretical level at
which I would like to place this paper. Also, as opposed to Mannheim (1936), he
does not conflate the problem of value-neutrality with that other conundrum I do not
mean to discuss here - "science" versus "ideology". Even if he does not discriminate
well between his various arguments, Myrdal bends towards the only one that, if
correct, would be decisive - i.e., that value judgments and judgment of facts cannot
be separated logically. This again makes him an appropriate subject for discussion.
The paper propounds a thesis 4, which is not part of the traditional legacy, and may
be located, as it were, between the last two; it expresses a weak non-neutrality
position. It starts with the broad claim that the question of making value judgments
does arise for the economist qua economist, and that he might, might and should, or
might not, make these judgments, depending on the case at hand. This claim clashes
with the strong neutrality thesis and fit in with the weak neutrality thesis. The line is
drawn with the latter by rejecting its containment claim. I will argue in effect that
value judgments in economics are neither easy to spot, nor few in number, nor
always separable - practically and even logically - from judgments of fact. In a
related move, I will investigate the authoritative criterion, and show, on the basis of
various problematic examples, that the positive-normative classification it implies for
economics is flawed, because it is neither exhaustive, nor exclusive, nor free from
counterintuitive consequences. However, my critique of neutrality stops a long way
from the strong non-neutrality thesis 3. Myrdal promoted unrestrictedly the view that
value and factual judgments cannot be separated logically, whereas I reserve it for a
subclass of economic statements.
Technically, the weak non-neutrality thesis 4 depends on splitting the traditional
concept of a value judgment into a statement and a judgment proper. This leads to a
two-stage procedure to discriminate between judgments of value and the other
judgments. The first stage scrutinizes the statement, and raises only one question, but
a difficult one: what kind of predicates does the statement contain? Some predicates
(like just) are clearly evaluative, some others (like more equal in terms of the Gini)
are clearly not, and many others are problematic. The second stage, which is of
particular interest for statements containing evaluative predicates, involves again
only one question, though again a difficult one: is the economist responsible for the
judgment associated with the statement? Because this is not always decidable, let
alone decidable consistently, the problematic area will increase by a degree of
magnitude. The two-stage analysis is able to explain why so many economic
statements fit in poorly with the positive-normative distinction.
3. Groundwork on economic evaluations
6To explain what separates judgments of fact and judgments of value has proven to be
a daunting task for philosophers, and no fully convincing account has yet emerged.
Nevertheless, it is only by drawing upon the work done in meta-ethics, deontic logic,
and analytical philosophy, that one could hope to make progress towards the sought-
after explication. It is a general suggestion of this paper that economic methodology
would benefit from becoming better acquainted with these areas.6
I start with a distinction in the style of analytical philosophy. When someone says or
writes, for example, "x is a good economic policy", one can attend to four different
things. There is the sentence itself, which is the linguistic entity, the statement, which
is what the sentence means, and the utterance or inscription, which is the material act
performed by the speaker or writer. Many analytical philosophers would refine this
threefold distinction without worrying about the fourth item of the judgment being
made.7 But my topic requires it to be present in the framework. I need it in order to
emphasize the speaker or the writer, in senses that are not exhausted by the notion of
an utterance or an inscription. Take an actor who says on the stage: "There are more
things in heaven and earth, Horatio,...". He makes the same utterance as Hamlet did
(supposing for simplicity that Hamlet and Horatio were historical figures, and
Hamlet once uttered the sentence). It seems sensible to conclude that the meaning of
the sentence remains unchanged, i.e., that the actor makes the same statement as
Hamlet did, but that the actor does not make any judgment, while Hamlet made one.
Sometimes, economists are in a position loosely analogous to the actor's: when
uttering " x is a good economic policy ", it is as if they recited the sentence. One
reason (there are others) for relying on four concepts instead of three is to capture
situations of this and related kinds. Without further argument, I will take the view
that the statement is not all that matters beyond the sentence, that a judgment goes
along with both the sentence and statement, and that the subject of this judgment is
not always identical with the source of the utterance or inscription.
The literature of economics and the social sciences, from Weber up to Sen and
Arrow, through Robbins and Myrdal, emphasizes value judgments at the expense of
value sentences, statements, and utterances. In a sense, it presents a defect opposite
to that which (for my purposes) analytical philosophy presents. The latter pays too
little attention to judgments, be they of fact or value. The historical reason for this
state of affairs is that it strongly rejects the older, Aristoletian logic of judgment, in
order to embrace the modern logic of quantifiers, predicates and operators.
Conversely, the neglect of linguistic features in the literature on economics and
social sciences can only be explained by its indirect reliance on the older logic – a
surprising anachronism in the late 20th century. Things being as they are, one
challenge of this paper was to bring these two streams of thought together.
When I say "evaluation", I mean any of the four items discussed above when a
judgment of value is made (it would help to have a common word also when a
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7judgment of fact is made, but there appears to be none). I wrote "statement" where
some would recommend "proposition", and there is a substantial reason for this
terminology. Philosophers take it to be a defining feature of propositions that they
have truth values, and it is contentious whether evaluations are either true or false. In
meta-ethics, the positivist and emotivist schools, on the one hand, and the intuitionist
and cognitivist schools, on the other, clash over this major issue; other schools have
their own complicated answers. Because positivism was so influential on the way
Friedman and Samuelson described normative work, and emotivism inspired Little's
(1950) reconstruction of welfare economics,8 I might be expected to take a position.
But that would require more than one paper, and fortunately, it is be possible to make
progress on the value neutrality problem without first solving the truth value
problem.
Now comes the main technical proposal, which was foreshadowed in last section. At
stage 1 of the analysis, I say of a non-analytical9 statement that it is logically
evaluative if it makes use of at least one evaluative predicate, logically factual if it
makes use of predicates that are all factual or logical, and logically neutral in
remaining cases. By this definition, to diagnose the statement expressed by the
sentence "Economic policy x is a good one" reduces to diagnosing the predicate
good. Stage 2 narrows down the analysis to those statements which are declared to be
either logically evaluative or logically factual. Only then is it relevant for the present
purposes to raise the question: does the economist make a judgment? Let us say that
the economist makes a judgment of value if the statement is logically evaluative and
the economist sincerely asserts it, that he makes a judgment of fact if the statement is
logically factual and the economist sincerely asserts it, and that he makes no
judgment at all if he does not make a sincere assertion. Thus, granted that by a stage
1 decision, "good" means an evaluative predicate in "x is a good economic policy",
one will at stage 2 ask whether or not the economist judges that x is a good economic
policy, and this will be answered by deciding whether or not he sincerely asserts the
corresponding statement. The assertion condition would be sufficient to solve the
Hamlet problem in its pure form since the actor does not assert anything on the
stage, but I added a sincerity requirement in order to handle analogical forms of this
problem in economics (I discuss below the case of a central banker). Some
philosophers will no doubt question my criterion of judgment, but its intent should
strikes them as being plain and acceptable - roughly speaking, I want to dispose of
those statements which economists make without really meaning them. As it stands,
stage 2 is defined only for elementary statements like the present example.
Something will be said later regarding two prominent classes of complex statements,
i.e. conditionals and belief statements.
Here are some clarifications about stage 1. The difference between statements and
sentences comes in handy here, because a given statement can be associated with
different sentences that express it more or less appropriately. To continue the
example, "Economic policy x is good" does not convey the economists' evaluative
meaning of "good" so well as "x is a good economic policy", since the good they
have in mind is not absolute, as in "Love is good", but relative to what economic
policies have in common. One may assume that, for each statement, there is a
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8canonical sentence to express it. The analysis must be carried out in terms of this
sentence alone, and if the ordinary language seems too ambiguous to formulate it,
there will a point in resorting to one of the artificial languages of contemporary logic.
The proposed taxonomy of statements at stage 1 excludes analytical statements, by
which I mean, following the usual philosophical definition, those statements which
can be declared true or false in virtue of the meaning of their constituent terms.10
Logical truths are a particular case, since they are true in virtue of the meaning of
their logical constituent terms. The definition also covers those statements which
depend for their truth or falsity on the meaning of their non-logical terms, such as:
equilibrium is a state of rest, to be equitable is to treat equals equally. For one reason
or another, mathematical theorems are usually counted among analytical statements.
There seems to be little point in asking either stage 2 or even stage 1 questions vis-à-
vis analytical statements; hence I excluded them at the outset. Simplifying the
terminology, I lump them with those non-analytical statements which stage 1
classifies as being logically neutral. I move on to this class now.
Crucially, the evaluative or factual predicate has to be genuinely used if the statement
is to count as being logically evaluative or factual. In terms of another classic
distinction, the canonical sentence must use, and not merely mention, the relevant
predicate symbols. However, as Hare (1952, p. 124-125) has argued, the distinction
must be handled with care when it comes to evaluative predicates. Here are two
examples that support his point. Unambiguously, the sentence ""Just" is a four-letter
word" expresses a logically factual statement. Contrast it with ""Just" means
"distributionally equal"". In many contexts, this sentence will express a logically
evaluative statement, even though the predicate word is again mentioned, not used.
The discrepancy comes from the fact that "Justice is distributional equality" would be
the canonical rendering for these contexts. Inverted commas in a sentence are not
sufficient evidence of mention. Conversely and more subtly, the absence of inverted
commas is not sufficient evidence of use. Here is an example adapted to economics.
Although doubting that Paretianism adequately captures the social good, I might still
say "x is better than y" instead of "x is Pareto-superior to y", meaning something
like: x is Pareto-superior to y, and welfare economists would add that x is better than
y. My statement alludes to a logically evaluative statement made by other people that
I happen to have in mind. This elliptical way of conveying my meaning would be
acceptably unambiguous in some relevant contexts. Suppose that I am giving a
welfare economics paper to a welfare economics group, and that I want to make a
purely technical point, without questioning the philosophical commitments of my
listeners. This and similar examples support Hare's point that one should be prepared
to take a generous view of mention, and a restrictive one of use, when analyzing the
evaluative language. I conclude that logically neutral statements will constitute a
wide-ranging category.
Although they are related to disguised quotations, belief sentences call for a separate
analysis. "Mrs. Thatcher believes that active trade unions are bad for the economy"
has a very different meaning from "Mrs. Thatcher says: "active trade unions are bad
for the economy"". The predicate bad, which is mentioned in the second case, is used
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9in the first. Accordingly, I will treat belief sentences containing evaluative words as
expressing logically evaluative statements. The commonsense intuition that they do
not correspond to value judgments made by the speaker will be captured by suitable
stage 2 decisions. Concerning the statement expressed by the first sentence, the
conclusion will be, as it should, that only Mrs. Thatcher, not the economist, makes a
sincere assertion that matches a value judgment. Having sketched a distinctive
treatment for disguised quotations and belief sentences, I should nonetheless
emphasize that there are many borderline cases.11
I now discuss stage 2 in terms of a few representative examples. Suppose the
following sentences were borrowed from economic texts, in which they were not in
inverted commas:
(a) "Some economists believe that to increase the interest rate is a good economic
policy."
(b) "Some economists believe that to increase the interest rate is a good economic
policy. But they do not realize that it would slow down the present recovery, which
would be a bad consequence."
(c) "Erik believes that I, the author, am mistaken in believing that to increase the
interest rate is a good economic policy."
I assume again that in these sentences "good" means an evaluative predicate. Now, if
the information concerning (a) were limited to that very sentence, the prima facie
view would be that the author does not make any value judgment at all. However, the
surrounding linguistic context may provide a different clue, as the next example
illustrates. The addition in (b) strongly suggests that the economist takes a stand on
the proposed policy, since he himself attributes a bad consequence to that policy.
However, further contextual information - either linguistic or external - might upset
the commonsense conclusion. Suppose that the author of (b) is Alan Greenspan.
Clearly, it is not the same whether the sentences were inscribed by the young
academic in the American Economic Review or by the present Chairman of the
Federal Reserve Bank in a press release. In the latter case, Greenspan would
presumably mean to convey something to the markets. For instance, he might be
willing to forestall a rise in the exchange rate of the dollar due to the prevailing
expectation that the Fed will raise the interest rate. It may even be that Greenspan
believes that it would be a good thing after all if the recovery were slowed down, and
suggests the contrary only because this helps him to make it clearer that he does not
intend to raise the interest case! If this were the case, Greenspan would make a
logically evaluative statement insincerely. The roundabout, but roughly plausible
example extends the Hamlet problem one step further: neither the actor, nor the
central banker makes the value judgment corresponding to the statement they make,
but Greenspan asserts something whereas the actor only recites a text. This is why I
introduced the sincerity requirement in the analysis of stage 2 attributions.
Examples (a), (b), and even more clearly (c), bring out the difficult problem of
extending this analysis to belief statements. I conceive of stage 2 decisions as being
concerned not with all and every statement that can be retrieved from (a), (b) and (c)
but only with this one: to increase the interest rate is a good economic policy. More
generally, I suggest dealing with belief statements in terms of the following
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algorithm. Decompose them until you reach all their elementary substatements, i.e.,
those substatements which do not contain any belief operator, and to those alone,
apply the two-stage analysis. While this method makes good sense, I cannot establish
that it will always deliver all the judgment of values that can be made in relation to a
belief statement, especially if the latter is nested as in (c). It may be that Erik's
higher-order belief involves evaluating the first-order belief (and me who holds it) as
being irrelevant or stupid. If this were the case, there would be value judgments
associated with the full statement itself, and not just with its elementary
substatements.
The analysis should also be extended to conditional statements. Consider for
instance:
(d) "If markets are competitive, they are efficient".
In economics, the predicate efficient ranges on a wide array of meanings, some of
them clearly factual, others frankly evaluative, still others ambiguous. On some well-
known interpretations of efficient, market and competitive, the sentence expresses an
analytical statement, i.e., the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics, and
the investigation does not even reach stage 1. On other construals, depending mostly
on what is being decided for efficient, (d) will express either a logically evaluative or
a logically factual statement, and supposing that the economist sincerely asserts it,
this will give rise to opposite conclusions at stage 2. This example suggests a few
generalities. First, non-nested conditionals must be taken as a whole since there
would no sense in applying the two-stage procedure to their antecedent and
consequent separately. Second, nested conditionals raise the same problem as nested
belief statements, i.e., there may or may not be value judgments specifically
connected with the whole as opposed to those accompanying its component parts.
(Consider the following: "If it is the case that if markets are competitive, they are
efficient, then it is good to abolish tariffs".) Third, many conditional sentences call
for an analytical interpretation, which luckily cuts short the more advanced
discussion. Among the analytical conditionals are not only the theorems of
mathematical economics, but also the statements that economists obtain by
establishing meaning connections; think of the biconditional that to be equitable is to
treat equals equally.
4. A word on economic prescriptions
Evaluations, it seems, trigger prescriptions. If I claim that x is a good economic
policy, and y is bad one, and if there is an action to be taken, which might favour one
against the other, my claim suggests another, i.e, that it is x, not y, that should be
promoted. Meta-ethical systems have elaborated on this linkage a great deal. It
makes it unavoidable that the groundwork be somewhat extended to cover economic
prescriptions.12
Compare the statements expressed by (a) "x is the best economic policy" with (c)
"society should implement economic policy x". Or compare (b) "x is a better
economic policy than y" with (d) "society should implement economic policy x
rather than y". Both (a) and (b) express evaluations, whereas (c) and (d) express
                                                
12 I use "prescription" in the same encompassing sense as I do "evaluation", i.e., to cover utterances or
inscriptions, sentences, statements, as well as judgments. This paper makes no effort to distinguish
obligations from prescriptions, despite the interesting dissimilarities that could be pointed out.
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prescriptions. Deontic logicians (e.g., Kalinowski, 1972, von Wright, 1983) have
established a demarcation line - the statements expressed by (c) and (d) do not have
the same logical form as those expressed by (a) and (b). Evaluations have a
predicative form, i.e., are logically formalized in terms of n-place predicates, but
prescriptions have a modal form, i.e., are logically formalized in terms of a modal
operator ("it is obligatory that") acting on sentences.
However they may differ in syntactical form, evaluations and prescriptions may well
be close to each other in semantic and pragmatic respects. There is indeed a classic
meta-ethical view, shared by Husserl, Hare, and many others, that at least moral
evaluations cannot be separated from corresponding prescriptions. The underlying
argument is that I cannot declare an action x to be morally best without implying that
one should do x, under the proviso that x is feasible. (A variant can be devised for
"morally better", but I will concentrate on the simple case.) Allegedly, the
implication is semantic, i.e., the meaning of "morally best" and "should" is what
permits the derivation of one claim from the other.
This argument seems hardly applicable to economics, which is not concerned with
the morally best or better. However, the notion that evaluations semantically entail
prescriptions is also endorsed by utilitarianism, which is not so fussy about what
counts as a moral claim and what does not, and utilitarianism is a doctrine of
perennial influence among economists. Sen (1979) conveniently factors it out into
three components, i.e., the making of interpersonal comparisons of a certain kind,
welfarism and, what is relevant here, consequentialism. By definition,
consequentialist theories derive their notion of a right action from the more basic
notion of a best state of affairs. The notion of a right action is only one step away
from that of a prescription. For a consequentialist, who has already made the step
from "x is the best economic policy" to "x is the right economic policy to take", the
final step to "society should implement economic policy x" seems quite
unproblematic. Hence, utilitarianism, or rather consequentialism, provides another
link connecting economic evaluations with prescriptions. However, the
consequentialist argument raises many philosophical problems of its own, which
means that it may not yet be the argument that economics needs. There are other
views available, but they would deliver the sought-after connection no more
convincingly than consequentialism does.
In view of this inconclusive attempt at tying up prescriptions with evaluations, one
had better not play down their prima facie differences. If commonsense suggests a
linkage of the two, it also takes it that they are not the same ideas. The warning needs
emphasizing because economists often overlook it. Witness Archibald:
"We have a single dichotomy in economics, between positive enquiries into how something
may be done, and normative recommendations that it should be done...Positive and
normative are separated in employment theory by a value judgment such as that 'we should
try to maintain full employment (rather than, e.g., stable prices) " (1959, p. 321, my
emphasis).
It may be that genuine prescriptions sometimes emerge from normative economics,
but Archibald's full employment example is clearly no such a case. He should say
that "a state of full employment with some inflation of the economy is better than a
state of underemployment with no inflation", or that "it would a good thing if one
could maintain full-employment, even if this involves paying an inflationary price". I
suspect that Archibald would grant the point, but dismiss it as being unimportant. On
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the contrary, it can be shown that this clarification matters to both the philosophy of
economics and economics itself.
When value judgments are redefined so as to include prescriptions, it becomes
tempting to overplay the rôle of the latter within the enlarged category. Archibald's
first sentence, which contrasts "positive enquiries" with "normative
recommendations that (something) should be done", exemplifies this trend:
evaluations properly defined vanish from his suggested division of economics.13  The
next step, which many economists take, consists in invoking Hume's thesis: from an
"is" no "ought" correctly follows (see Treatise on Human Nature, III, I). Since
Hume's divide seems to be sharp and definitive, economists often end up founding
the positive-normative distinction on it, rather than on the required analysis of value
judgments. They leave the authoritative criterion unexamined, while the neater
logical argument monopolizes their attention. The problem of value-neutrality retains
its Weberian formulation, but its solution is allegedly forthcoming in Humean terms!
I have found evidence for this replacement strategy among virtually all defenders of
the extreme neutrality thesis, plus a few others. It cannot be decisive, because the
best that Hume's thesis could achieve would be to set aside from positive economics
only the prescriptive part of normative economics. It may or may not be the case that
variants of Hume's thesis adapted to evaluations illuminate the value-neutrality
problem; this question is explored in another paper, where it receives a negative
answer. What the present paper denies is that the strategy in its initial, crude form
works. Section 6 shows that this denial is sufficient to block Robbins's plea for
strong neutrality.
Making one further step, I will argue by means of an example that to conflate
prescriptions with evaluations fosters not only philosophical confusion about
economics, but also theoretical confusion within economics. Take the famous k%-
rule of monetary growth that was "recommended" by Friedman (1968). What was
exactly its status? It seems fair to say that there was no genuine agreement among
those monetarist economists who, for at least some years, followed Friedman in
recommending it. Some apparently believed that the money supply was an
instrument variable, and then took the rule to be bluntly prescriptive. Others knew
well that the money stock was more of the nature of an objective than of an
instrument, and for them, the rule enjoined the Central Bank to take whatever steps
were appropriate in order to achieve a k% annual increase in the money stock.
Viewed in this way, the k%-rule remained prescriptive, although in a different way:
suppose the Bank would have taken appropriate steps and nonetheless failed to
achieve a k% increase; then, it would not have failed its obligation. Other monetarists
believed the rule to be only a means to achieve the only truly significant prescription,
which was "Avoid unnecessary inflation", and still others might have understood it
more like an evaluation - it is a good thing if the Central Bank achieves a k% annual
increase. The problem with this famous rule was not so much that those who
"recommended" it disagreed amongst themselves as that they did not have the
concepts to describe their lack of agreement.
5. Good and the evaluative predicates of economics
                                                
13 See also: "Modern economic theory draws a sharp distinction between positive economics, which
explains the working of the economic system, and welfare economics, which prescribes policy"
(Scitovksy, 1941, p. 77).
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This section is concerned with stage 1 decisions, i.e., with the predicates of
economics. I tackle the problem they raise - are they evaluative or not? - by
discussing a few major examples in turn, starting with good and its relational forms.
Earlier, I suggested that those economists who uttered "economic policy x is good"
really meant "x is a good economic policy", which is to say more explicitly,
"economic policy x is good qua economic policy". This can be formalized in terms
of a classic distinction of meta-ethics. Economics makes attributive use of the
predicate good, to be contrasted with its predicative use, as in "Love is good", which,
if at all significant, must be reserved for ethics. Those philosophers, like Geach
(1956), who claim that the attributive use is automatically descriptive, would
conclude that there is no evaluative good in economics. However, their claim is
prima facie implausible. The descriptive interpretation works for sentences like "x is
a good hygrometer", but not for, say, "x is a good sunset". Hare (1957) argues from
this contrast that a necessary condition for "good" to be descriptive is that "x" in the
sentence be a functional word, i.e., a word the definition of which explains what x is
for. To say what an economic policy is for requires one to have a theoretical outlook
as well as moral and political commitments; it is clearly not enough to know the
meaning of "economic policy". The expression is not functional, and in the end
comes closer to "sunset" than "hygrometer". I may conclude that there are clear and
important occurrences of the evaluative good in economics (of course, this does not
preclude cases of descriptive good).
It would be a mistake to believe that, with the last claim, the ethical good re-enters
economics by the back door. To attribute that kind of good to a thing or state of
affairs requires one to take into account and weigh against each other the various
goodness considerations of the case. By contrast with this "all-things-considered"
notion, economists concentrate on just a few aspects of what is good or bad in a thing
or a state of affairs. They typically indicate the restriction by saying "economic such-
and-such" (in early welfare economics) or "social such-and-such" (in social choice
theory and later welfare economics). Economists employ these two adjectives as
modifiers of "welfare", which they often take to be another expression for "the
good", as Sen (1991, p. 15) aptly points out; so it is worth discussing how they define
"economic welfare" and "social welfare". According to Pigou (1920), the former was
"that part of welfare that can be brought into relation with the measuring rod of
money". This famous definition turned out to be too narrow, but is useful in
revealing the economists' policy of selecting just a few aspects of the good for
consideration. Graaff (1957) went beyond Pigou by saying that "economic welfare"
was a subspecies of "general welfare", and further tried to explicate the difference
between the two in terms of various causes acting on welfare, some of them
economic, and others not. Again, this was too specific a construction, but it testifies
to the profession's intellectual strategy. Under Arrovian influences, the expression
"social welfare" has come to displace "economic welfare" even in welfare
economics. It still carries definite restrictions with it. Economists have enlarged the
meaning of the good they considered earlier by including collective rationality
considerations into it, but even so, they stop a long way from an "all-things-
considered" conception. To illustrate, think of the educational view of the state as
teaching the citizen to be more virtuous and knowledgeable. It seems as if even the
most resolutely liberal theories of the state will include a modicum of this view, so
one feels authorized to make it part of the conception of the collective good.
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However, standard social welfare functions cannot possibly take it into account since
they depend on fixed individual preference data, whereas the educational view would
require these data to evolve.
In sum, the location of the economic good on the philosophers' map appears to be
this. It is always attributive, often non-functional, and in this non-functional quality,
evaluative, implicitly restricted, and different from the ethical good. For the position
I am trying to articulate, it is important to stress the last feature. To deemphasize
economic prescriptions, as I did in last section, would be problematic if it were the
case that economics used the ethical good after all. This does not imply, of course,
that the economic good might be ethically irrelevant; on the contrary, to the extent
that it summarizes partial goodness considerations, it does matter to the ethical good.
There are many evaluative predicates beside good, and I move on to those which
may be called thick after Williams (1985, p. 140). Their defining feature is that they
have an evaluative and a descriptive side at a time. As Williams and others have
argued, these two sides are as inseparable as those of a coin; any attempt to extract
the descriptive from the evaluative is bound to distort meanings unacceptably.
Ethical examples include courageous, honest, liar, grateful. It is a minor innovation
of this paper to extend the thickness concept to the evaluations made in economics
and the social sciences. The ethical good is the usual candidate for thinness, i.e., the
opposite property of being exclusively evaluative. Some have argued that it is thick
after all, though not as thick as, say, courageous, and it would be easy to devise a
similar argument for the economic good. However, there are more obvious examples
of thick economic predicates, and I briefly discuss them now.
Just calls for a preliminary analysis that is very roughly analogous to that carried for
good. This predicate functions in economics differently from the corresponding
ethical concept - moral justice - though it is relevant for this concept - economic
justice contributes towards moral justice. This again reflects the economists' policy
of imposing semantic restrictions. They relate justice to distributive issues almost
exclusively, neglecting corrective and commutative justice, which, by contrast, are
central to legal theory. Further, although today's economists do not limit attention to
money income and commodity bundles, the range of items they consider for a just
distribution remains limited. The two restrictions, along with the historical fact that
economists tend to connect distributive justice with equality, shape a specialized
meaning for just and its variants, equitable, fair, etc. By the same token, these
predicates are thick. In a number of contexts of economics, the statement that x is a
more just state of affairs than y must be understood as implying the descriptive
statement that the distribution of goods or money is closer to equality in x than in y.
Rational is clearly evaluative in economics, but does not belong to the same group as
just because it does not have any direct ethical counterpart. Accordingly, it can at
most be invested with indirect ethical relevance. In other respects, rational is not
unlike just. The meaning of this predicate depends on restrictions, some of them
stipulated, others implicit, which load it with a descriptive content. It is thick to the
point of allowing predictive use in relevant circumstances.
I single out a less noticeable class of thick predicates of economics, which have the
peculiarity of applying both to states of affairs or actions and to statements made
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about these items. Common examples involve relevant, acceptable, satisfactory,
defensible, reasonable, compelling. Ordinary conversation allows for "this is a
relevant action to take" as well as "your comment is relevant". In contrast, economics
tends to employ a more specialized evaluative vocabulary at the first-order level,
reserving "relevant" and related expressions for second-order evaluative use. How
this works is nicely illustrated by Arrow's (1951) handling of the assumptions for his
impossibility theorem. He is careful to phrase the assumptions technically, but then
comments on them using the previous predicates; his assessment actually goes across
the whole spectrum of approbation, from "relevant" to "compelling". What
descriptive content such predicates have depends in part on what they imply about
first-order items, in part on acquired meanings. For instance, Arrow would argue that
non-imposition is compelling, given the free-market, democratic societies he is
restricting attention to.
The reader might expect me go beyond the stage of giving examples and making
internal classifications: surely, the basic objective is to become able to recognize
whether or not a predicate of economics has an evaluative side. While admitting that
I do not provide a criterion, I stress that philosophers have done no better. What their
work offers is a list of necessary conditions for a statement to count as an evaluation
that have the extra property of not being also necessary for the statement to count as
a statement of fact. I now give a quick summary of the proposed items (some are
more questionable than others).
Evaluative predicates, and then evaluations, are comparative. They come in a
gradation. They make implicit reference to a reference point, and comparisons
between objects are secondary to comparisons between the objects and this yardstick.
The latter is often located at the positive extreme of the gradation, like an ideal;
however, it may sit towards the middle, like a standard of normality, or even at the
negative extreme, like an absolute foil. Evaluations are subjective in the sense that
they presuppose a subject to make them, and perhaps even in the stronger sense of
being completely specified only if the subject who makes them is indicated. An
evaluative predicate is never equivalent to any list of descriptive predicates, but
depends - in the sense of a mathematical function - on one such list.14 Now, consider
elementary statements such as are expressed canonically by "x is P". Empirical
evidence is not relevant to them in the same way whether "P" means an evaluative or
a descriptive predicate. Specifically (this condition is central to Friedman's and
Lipsey's drawing of the positive-normative distinction), elementary evaluative
statements are empirically irrefutable in some circumstances in which elementary
descriptive statements would be empirically refutable, and disagreements about
primitive evaluative statements are left unresolved in some circumstances in which
disagreements about elementary descriptive statements would be resolved. Finally, I
have already mentioned the claim made by some philosophers that there are
entailment relations between evaluations and prescriptions. Here I retain the much
weaker point that evaluative predicates are somehow connected in terms of meaning
with action-predicates.
                                                
14 In the philosophers' jargon, an evaluative predicate superven s on a list of descriptive predicates.
Without using the word, Arrow aptly summarizes what it means (1951-1963, p.112). Hurley (1989)
was the first to discuss supervenience in relation to Arrow and economics at large.
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All these candidates are important prima facie. I will make the logical and
argumentative jump from those unanalyzed suggestions to the following conclusion.
Evaluative predicates share some universal properties that descriptive predicates do
not share to the same extent, and the previous list provides a rough indication of
these properties. No set of necessary and sufficient conditions for an evaluation is
known, none of the necessary conditions is very informative when taken in isolation,
and any set of necessary conditions, like the one here, remains open to doubts, but
the present list tells us something suggestive in the end. A related and slightly weaker
claim is that the presence of the logically evaluative can often be recognized in actual
practice. Although there are many borderline cases, most of us are perhaps not too
bad at deciding where a given predicate belongs.
It is a further jump, though perhaps not a major one, to the conclusion that the
economic concept of preference is evaluative. The predicate that economists mean by
"is preferred to" passes the rough-and-ready test of the necessary conditions above.
Like the ordinary language predicate, the economists' is comparative and admits of
gradations. It does not involve a yardstick in every circumstance, but it sometimes
does (e.g., when the consumer has a satiation point, or there is some "golden rule" of
action). It has become a tenet of economics since Pareto and Hicks that preferences
are subjective, and they are usually indexed by individual bearers. As is the case with
ordinary preference, the economists' predicate depends, in the mathematical sense, on
descriptive properties of the things it compares, but it does not mean these
descriptive properties. Last but not least, the economists' preference is action-related
to the extent that it connects with choice. The exact connection is a matter of dispute,
but the main competing construals appear to share the view that preference and
choice are linked to each other in terms of their meaning, not accidentally, which is
all I need as far as this condition goes. It entails that empirical observations about
choices are relevant; how strongly this evidence counts depends on the particular
construal.
The claim that preference counts among the evaluative predicates of economics is
likely to cause misunderstandings that I had better clear up now. Suppose that I utter
the sentences (S) "I prefer Burgundy to Bordeaux wine" and (S') "Dan prefers
Bordeaux to Burgundy wine". According to the commonsense view of this example,
I make a value judgment in the former case, and not in the latter. How can one
recover commonsense in the present framework? A conceivable answer is that the
preference predicate, being ambiguous in general, conveniently turns out to
evaluative in (S) and non-evaluative in (S'). However, this answer is easy to reject.
The way to make the preference predicate non-evaluative is drastically to simplify its
semantic connection with choice. It amounts to interpreting "i prefers A to B" as
meaning "i chooses A rather than B whenever i is given the choice between A and B"
- the revealed preference semantics of preference. Most philosophers of economics
and not a few economists reject this semantics as inadequate.15 And even if the
revealed preference semantics were not flawed, a formal point would still apply: the
same semantics cannot be adopted for (S') and dismissed for (S). It cannot be the
case that the meaning connection of preference with choice is tight when I quote or
report on Dan, and suddenly loosens when I speak for myself.
                                                
15 See, e.g., Sen (1982), Hausman and McPherson (1996), Mongin and d'Aspremont (1998), Hausman
(2000).
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A more promising line about (S) and (S') emphasizes the intuitive difference between
expressing and reporting on a preference judgment. In marked contrast with the
earlier one, this argument presupposes that the preference predicate is always
evaluative. Given that the predicate is used, and not just mentioned, in both (S) and
(S'), the decision is pushed from stage 1 to 2 for either sentence. In order to achieve
the final separation, I propose to understand preference in the following way: to
prefer x to y is to believe that x is preferable to y. This is an unconventional but
relatively non-committal semantics; in particular, it need not sever the links between
preference and choice. The point is to turn preference statements into particular cases
of belief statements. Then, the decision procedure sketched for the latter becomes
available, with the opposite results one would hope for. In the case of (S), I sincerely
assert a logically evaluative elementary substatement (Burgundy is preferable to
Bordeaux) but nothing of the kind occurs with (S').
6. The strong neutrality and non-neutrality theses
The analysis of stage 1 is virtually all that is needed in order to dismiss the two
extreme neutrality and non-neutrality theses. Admittedly, they appeared to be
implausible at the outset. But it is important to fill out the argument against them in a
way that agrees with the groundwork and prepares the more advanced conclusions to
come relative to the non-extreme theses.
The following passage by Myrdal summarizes the case for the strong non-neutrality
thesis 3:
"A disinterested social science has never existed and, for logical reasons, cannot exist. The
value connotations of our main concepts represent our interest in a matter, give direction to
our thoughts and significance to our inferences. It poses the questions without which there
are no answers.
The recognition that our very concepts are value-loaded implies that they cannot be defined
except in terms of political valuations. It is indeed on account of scientific stringency that
these valuations should be made explicit. They represent value premises for scientific
analysis; contrary to widely held opinions, not only the practical conclusions from a
scientific analysis, but this analysis itself depends necessarily on value premises " (1958, p.
1-2).16
Not everywhere does Myrdal equate evaluations with political evaluations (compare
1958, p. 54), so I ignore an addition that could only weaken his case. Essentially, he
makes two points. First, evaluations are pervasive because they are connected with
the social scientist's selective interest in the scientific material and his way of making
sense of it. Second, evaluations play a semantic rôle (concepts are defined in terms of
evaluations) as well as an inferential rôle (unstated evaluations are like missing
premisses). A third claim in the form of a recommendation, which is typical of
Myrdal, does not surface explicitly in the quote: social scientists should state their
evaluations as clearly and completely as they can.
The first claim is crucial to the other two, and even the most generous reading cannot
make much of it. If it means that one cannot be seriously interested in an object, or
make a selection relative to that object, without evaluating some or all of its features,
the claim is simply false. It is possible - in the sense of both "logically compatible"
                                                
16 The passage is discussed in Klappholz (1964) differently and, at a crucial stage, wrongly (when, in a
typically Robbinsian way, he defends neutrality in terms of "is" and "ought").
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and "actually feasible" - for an economist to investigate income inequality in France
without feeling that there is anything good, or anything bad, with the French income
distribution. The fact that inequality theorists usually feel strongly about inequality
belongs to sociological observation, and is irrelevant to the point. Now, if the claim
means that to express an interest in inequality theory involves evaluating its
relevance favourably, the claim becomes unobjectionable, but it then asserts very
little. It does not separate the social from the natural sciences, contrary to the
suggestion, and worse, provides no basis for making the second and third claims. It is
implausible that evaluations of the I-find-my-field-interesting style seriously
interfere with meanings and inferences, and nothing would be gained from
publicizing them.
One way or another, the criticisms of last paragraph have been made several times.17
I had to echo them, but, in the framework of this paper, there is a neater point to
stress. Not everything in economics can be evaluative simply because not every
predicate of economics is evaluative. Some (though not all) economic measures are
descriptive, and accordingly, enter logically factual statements. Phillips's (1958)
measures of unemployment and inflation in the historic paper strike today's
econometricians as being poor and even biased, but I have never seen them being
criticized on the ground that they were directed by evaluations. That Phillips selected
the time lags that would deliver a nicely downward sloping curve is an objection
very different from the Myrdalian one that his selection was guided by a value
judgment. Readers who remain suspicious of complex measures like these are
welcome to think of tons of cement, numbers of supermarkets, or income tax rates.
The strong neutrality thesis 1 is epitomized in a well-known passage by Robbins:
"Economics", says Mr. Hawtrey, "cannot be dissociated from Ethics." Unfortunately, it does
not seem logically possible to associate the two studies in any form but mere juxtaposition.
Economics deals with ascertainable facts; ethics with valuations and obligations. The two
fields of inquiry are not on the same plane of discourse. Between the generalizations of
positive and normative studies there is a logical gulf... Propositions involving the verb
"OUGHT" are different in kind from propositions involving the verb "IS"" (1932-1935, p.
148-149).
As with Myrdal, it needs some generosity to go beyond the bullish style and isolate
analyzable claims. The more visible one is that the value-neutrality problem is solved
by Hume's thesis about "is" and "ought". If my argument against the replacement
strategy is correct, Robbins and his followers lose a crucial weapon in their armoury.
By a symmetric mistake, the non-neutrality theorists often directed their fire at
Hume's thesis, as if this would be sufficient to debunk the enemy (see Myrdal, 1958,
p. 9 and 48, and the comments by Streeten).
A secondary claim in Robbins is that economics should be separate from ethics. To
the extent that there is more than Hume's thesis underlying this claim, it becomes
another defense of his position. Instead of rebuking it directly, I will argue that even
if it were granted, the consequence that normative economics is illegitimate would
not follow. The jump comes from the thought that ethical evaluations are the only
ones to be considered. But some evaluative predicates of economics are not ethical -
                                                
17 Weber (1922) exposed the non sequitur in the first claim by means of the famous distinction
between value judgment and value relation (Werturteil and  Wertbeziehung), which has become bread-
and-butter for later methodologists.
19
one example being rational - and create room for a kind of normative economics that
eludes Robbins's dichotomy between economics and ethics. To avoid this non
sequitur objection, one would have to make absurd claims, e.g., that economists do
not genuinely use the predicate rational, or that it enters statements they do not
sincerely assert. Bizarrely, Robbins recognized that an agent's ordinary preferences
were evaluations of a non-ethical sort, but when it came to economists, as opposed to
agents, he forgot about this logical possibility. His "ethical" opponents based their
view on the same omission, and regrettably, it infects the work of weak neutrality
theorists such as Bergson and Samuelson.18
For the LSE economists who followed Robbins, his strong neutrality thesis was
compatible, despite the appearances, with the programme of the new welfare
economics; allegedly, it was sufficient to reinterpret the latter appropriately (see
Lancaster (1958) and Archibald (1959)).19 I turn to this argument, which still enjoys
some popularity today. The reinterpretation is to be furnished by the revealed
preference semantics. Applying it to "state x Pareto-dominates state y", one gets a
new sentence that makes a logically descriptive statement:
"states x and y are such that whenever the individuals are given the choice between the two,
all choose x rather than y".
In order to recast the notion of a general optimum, one first takes it to mean a Pareto
optimum, and then apply the previous translation. The resulting notion is roughly
this: a state that would be among the unanimously chosen ones if it were feasible.
Since the new welfare economics centers on the marginal conditions for a general
optimum, the bulk of its work can now be claimed by positive economics. Archibald
goes as far as to say that the reinterpretation transforms the first fundamental welfare
theorem into an empirically refutable statement.
A point to be clarified is: what are the choice-based factual construals intended for?
On one reading, they are meant to replace the initial formulations; on another, to
coexist with them. If the weak reading is adopted, the new welfare economics will
live in two locations separated by a Robbinsian line: economics when the revealed
preference semantics prevails, something else than economics otherwise. If anything,
this ubiquity speaks against the way of drawing the line. Only the strong reading is
consistent, but it raises the objection that the choice-based semantics deprives
welfare economics of its theoretical significance. Take the first welfare theorem.
Archibald's refutable version has little interest; the best it could offer is a roundabout
way of testing whether some economic state is a competitive equilibrium, while
direct methods are more to the point. By contrast, the statement of the theorem using
Paretian concepts is important, and what is important about it can be explained only
in a logically evaluative way. It may be that welfare is not what matters about a
Pareto optimum, but whatever else there is, say efficiency or freedom, must be stated
evaluatively. Granted this easy point, the dismissal of the LSE doctrine is completed
by arguing that the discussion about what matters should take place within welfare
economics, not elsewhere; this seems to be another easy step to make.
                                                
18 Little (1950, p. 69) stands apart. He is aware of the distinction but denies that it should be made:
"the value judgments which enter welfare economics are of an ethical kind". His emotivist conception
of evaluations may be responsible for this sweeping claim.
19 The argument was a LSE collective creation, involving Lipsey as well (see Lancaster, 1958, p. 464,
n.1, and Archibald, 1959, p. 322, n. 2). It originates in a hint from Little (1950, p. 38).
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Importantly, the dismissal here does not depend on the philosophical claim that the
revealed preference semantics is inadequate. It also works against the formalistic
argument for strong neutrality that has become widespread today, i.e., that the
statements of welfare economics are just mathematical ones, and for that reason, the
field really belongs to positive economics. I will move on to the next item on the
agenda, i.e., the weak neutrality thesis 2.
7. Studying a value judgment versus making it
As is well-known, Weber (1922) promoted the basic distinction between making a
value judgment, as when someone says "x is good", and taking it as an object of
study, as the same person would do when investigating, reconstructing, or trying to
explain the very same judgment. By promoting the distinction among economists,
Robbins renewed their understanding of Keynes's earlier demarcation. They
implicitly adopted what I called the authoritative criterion, which says that a
statement made by an economist counts as normative if the accompanying judgment
is a value judgment made by that very same economist, and that it counts as positive
otherwise. My strategy will be to show that Weber's distinction does not ground a
satisfactory division of economics; this amounts to rebutting the authoritative
criterion. I will point out cases of economic statements which, it the criterion were
applied, would qualify neither as positive nor as normative, and opposite cases in
which the statements would qualify as being both at a time. I will finally devise an
example in which the division is clear-cut but unintuitive.
The two-stage analysis of evaluations cannot be conclusive in all and every
circumstance. A version of the Greenspan scenario brings this point home. If the
contextual information is not rich enough, observers will be at a loss to decide what
this manipulative central banker really meant in his press release (see (b) in section
3). Thus, readers who accept the groundwork may already be persuaded that the
authoritative criterion cannot deliver an exhaustive division of economics. To
reinforce the conclusion, I will revisit Weber's analysis of the trade-unionist, which is
a locus classicus of the weak neutrality tradition.20 According to Weber, the social
scientist aims at causally explaining the trade-unionist's value-commitments, and for
this, needs to rely on a coherent and reasonably complete view of what these
commitments are. This crucial step, Weber adds, does not involve the social scientist
in adopting, endorsing, or approving of, any of the trade unionist's values. Note first
that if "the trade-unionist" referred to an historical individual, the social scientist
would not face the task that is being described. A biographer of, say, Clement Attlee,
is not required to turn the value judgments expressed by his character into a
consistent whole. He may just tell the reader what he can reasonably conjecture,
without trying to fill all gaps and apparent inconsistencies. However, "the trade-
unionist" here refers to an ideal-typical individual, which explains the stringent
requirements that Weber mentions. It is part of the definition of an ideal-type that it
is internally consistent and as complete as the theoretical investigation requires it to
be. While emphasizing these two requirements correctly, Weber was wrong in not
                                                
20 See Der Sinn der Wertfreiheit in Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre (1922, p. 500-502).
Elsewhere in the same paper, Weber explains what it means for the scientist neutrally to deal with a
value judgment (e.g., 1922, p. 485). Die Objectivität sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer
Erkenntnis is briefer on the same topic but nonetheless important because it draws the connection, to
be discussed below, with the topic of instrumental rationality.
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acknowledging that they created a severe tension with axiological neutrality. The
following argument brings this objection home.
Assume that a sequence of stage 2 decisions leads to the conclusion that a trade
unionist make value judgments V1,...,Vn. Each of these judgments corresponds to a
statement made by the representative individual, and a set of statements may or may
not be logically consistent. If it is not, the question arises: which of the statements
corresponding to V1,...,Vn should be taken out in order to restore consistency?
Supposing that consistency has been restored (or was there from the start), another
question arises: how is the set to be expanded in order to provide a sufficiently
complete picture? Weber assumes that logic is all that the social scientist needs in
order to adjust the initial V1,...,Vn. But logic is insufficient; it just sets the constraints
within which to pursue a rejection or acceptance policy. One wonders how social
scientists would proceed if they did not retain the values they accept, and eliminate
the values they reject. It would be too bold to claim that this is the only basis for their
choices. But it is surely one to be envisaged, and it fosters the suspicion that
evaluations may permeate their ideal-typical reconstructions of value-positions. The
conclusion to draw is that this kind of work will often illustrate the indeterminacy
between the positive and the normative. The argument is not meant to apply to ideal-
types generally; it is a subspecies of them I have been concerned with.
As far as economics is concerned, there is something to be said against the
indeterminacy conclusion. Robbins (1932, p. 148) discusses the case of the
consumer's preference for pork. Economists, he says, do not need to express the view
that it is good or bad to consume pork in order to investigate the consumer's
preference for this commodity. Granted that a preference involves an evaluation on
the agent's part, this is a crude case of the ideal-types I have singled out, and it seems
to raise very little problem indeed. The more general point about economics is that it
introduces a good deal of its ideal-types by way of stipulation. There is the typical
consumer, who likes or does not like pork, the typical von Neumann-Morgenstern
agent, who is or is not risk-averse, the typical optimizing agent of dynamic macro-
economics who is or is not myopic, and so on. The stipulative definition secures
consistency, and does not aim at completeness, because it serves only to highlight a
particular logical or causal linkage. I grant the exception constituted by this wide
class of economic ideal-types, and concentrate instead on the, I think equally wide,
class of those which approximate the trade-unionist model. They are numerous in
economic history and development economics.21 Strikingly, they occur in theoretical
economics too, because, for argumentative purposes, economists need to construe
ideal-types of their opponents' value positions. For instance, although few of today's
readers are aware of this historical connection, Arrow's work in 1951 largely
revolves around a refutation of Bergson's welfare economics. He restates his
opponent's views by adding features so as to make up a complete evaluative system
that falls prey to the impossibility theorem. Despite the non-Weberian twist of
emphasizing inconsistency of the resulting system, this is an ideal-typical
reconstruction all right, and it illustrates how the social scientist's own value
commitments mingle with those attributed to the adversary. Thus, Arrow makes
"independence of irrelevant alternatives" part of Bergson's system although nothing
                                                
21 Think for instance of Rostow's (1965) construction of "taking off" in his stage theory of economic
growth  or the recent work on "globalization" in development economics.
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in the welfare economist's work supports this inclusion.22 There is only one
explanation for this move. At the time, Arrow believed independence to be
normatively compelling, so that Bergson would have to accept it willy-nilly.
My next objection is that the authoritative criterion is not exclusive. I base it on the
way in which thick evaluative predicates function semantically (see section 5). To
illustrate, consider the following sentence from a hypothetical development
economist:
"If people are sufficiently well fed, and have access to basic education and health care, they
do not live in a state of poverty".
The poverty predicate has an evaluative content since the word means something
undesirable. That it has a descriptive content seems equally clear: like the economist
here, most of us believe that the concept of a "poverty line" makes good sense, even
if we disagree on where to place it. Thus, poverty is thick, and this entails that the
elementary substatement expressed by "they do not live in a state of poverty" is both
logically evaluative and factual. On the assumption that the economist is sincerely
asserting the whole statement, the two-stage analysis concludes that he makes both a
judgment of value and a judgment of fact. Because these judgments accompany the
same substatement, the authoritative criterion must classify it as being both
normative and positive. Compare this conclusion with the earlier one reached in the
trade-unionist example. This time, the criterion is not indeterminate but
overdetermined.
There are manoeuvres to circumvent the objection, and as far as I can see, they
amount to interpreting the thick predicate-word "poverty" as if it were ambiguous
between the descriptive and the evaluative. By resolving the supposed ambiguity in
the former way, one would conclude that the development economist is making only
a judgment of fact. However, it is thickness, not ambiguity, which is at issue here. A
thick predicate has its two sides simultaneously, not alternatively like an ambiguous
predicate. This is not an incidental property because the predicate would have no
factual meaning if it lacked its evaluative meaning. To confirm that poverty fits this
analysis, consider the following hypothetical retort to the development economist:
"People who are sufficiently well fed, and have access to basic education and health care, do
live in a state of poverty if they cannot satisfy more than these basic needs."
The two parties entertain opposite factual views about poverty. The reason of their
disagreement is that they differ in evaluating the condition of enjoying barely the
basic necessities of life. For the economist, this social condition cannot be factually
the same as poverty because it is relatively desirable; the respondent reaches the
opposite conclusion because he believes the condition to be definitely undesirable.
The two parties will not settle their debate unless they discuss their evaluations as
such. This illustrates the sense in which evaluations can be said to be semantically
prior to the factual meanings.23
Finally, the authoritative criterion sometimes involves a counterintuitive division
between the positive and the normative. Take an economist who investigates a value
                                                
22 Bergson (1954) rightly complained that he had been misrepresented; see the assessment in Mongin
(2000).
23 Weber (1922, p. 516) implicitly discussed thickness when considering progress. He found it so
heavily value-loaded that he recommended that social scientists should give it up altogether. This is a
desperate move; it would destroy a good deal of interesting work carried out by historians.
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judgment made by some agent, and happens not only to endorse it, but also to make
it clear that he does. The criterion wants us to conclude that a normative statement
was made, but this can be a completely unnatural conclusion, as the following
concocted example suggests. "The Muslim part of the population thinks that it is
despicable to eat pork, which affects the pork consumption in East London". After
writing this sentence, the economist adds: "I myself disapprove of eating pork". If
there were just the first sentence, it would straightforwardly belong to positive
economics according to the two-stage analysis and the criterion applied in
succession. However, the second sentence brings further information. The
substatement expressed by "it is despicable to eat pork" is logically evaluative and -
it seems plausible to infer - sincerely asserted by the economist. Thus, the two-stage
procedure leads to the conclusion that he has made a value judgment, and applying
the authoritative criterion, one would add that the statement expressed by the first
sentence is normative after all. This sounds like an odd result. Suppose that the
economist wrote the second sentence as an incidental warning – say, because being a
Muslim himself, he was worried that his involvement might lead him to misinterpret
the facts. The change of status incurred by the statement would be the more troubling
since an exacting standard for positive economics motivated the troublesome
addition! Note that I do not question the point that the economist made a value
judgment. I argue that this is not by itself a reason for locating his work on the
normative side of the division.
The East London example brings out the issue of the social scientist's diverse modes
of endorsement. If the agent says "I think x is good", the economist can approve of
this either by expressing the same first-order evaluation: "I too think that x is good",
or by making second-order evaluations such as: "It is good to think that x is good" or
"It is good for Agent to think that x is good". The various modes are clearly distinct
semantically, and one may submit that they do not carry the same consequences for
the positive-normative distinction. Provided that contextual information is rich
enough, first-order endorsements will not be too much of a problem for the
distinction. It is often possible to separate incidental value judgments, as in the East
London example, from significant ones, as would be the case if the same economist
had stated in detail why he thinks that eating pork is despicable. Second-order
endorsements normally call for an explication, so one would not expect them to be
incidental. When made in the absolute way ("It is good to..."), they suggest that a
value judgment is made, and this in turn signals a shift to the normative. When made
in the relative way ("It is good for Agent to..."), only contextual information helps
decide whether a value judgment is really made. I do not pursue the fine details here,
meaning just to open up a hardly noticed topic. With their loose concept of
approbation, Weberians and Robbinsians have blurred semantic distinctions that
prima facie matter to the positive-normative divide of economics.
8. Ends and means
Both the strong and weak neutrality theses are often defended by invoking a time-
honoured claim about instrumental reasoning. Scientists, it is often said, take as
given the ends of those whom they advise and only explore the means to achieve
these ends. Because this requires no more than citing the relevant laws of nature,
scientists manage to keep moral concerns entirely aside. Positivist and related
writers, like Poincaré (1913) in a famous paper, make this claim for the applied
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natural sciences. Weber twisted it twice by adapting it to the problem situation of the
theoretical social science, and in doing this, made it part of his plea for value-
neutrality. This transformed the claim into another one: social scientists can and
should take as given the ends of those agents whose actions they investigate. Starting
from the given ends, social scientists explore the means to achieve them, and in their
inquiry, only employ or uncover laws of human action. One of Weber's supporting
examples was the law of diminishing marginal utility; he argued that neo-classical
theorists stated it without making any value judgment on the economic man's ends.
Logically, Weber's instrumental neutrality claim stands or falls by itself, irrespective
of what is decided vis-à-vis his already discussed distinction between making a value
judgment and taking it as an object of study. The standard discussion of neutrality
usually misses this point. The Weberians conflated the various components of their
case in a way that made it difficult to analyze; at first sight, it was a package, a
matter of take-it-or-leave-it. This encouraged the perverse habit - among followers
and opponents alike - of using "ends" and "values" more or less interchangeably.24
The instrumental neutrality claim is roughly plausible for such fields as military
history, prehistory or archaeology, which do employ instrumental reasoning for
analyzing human action and its products. But my subject is economics, and I will
argue that the claim is unlikely to carry much weight there, because the end-means
distinction is not really part of the economist's theoretical apparatus. The
economist's tools for investigating purposeful action consist of preference and related
notions, like utility. To be precise, there are two economic dichotomies, one
opposing the preference relation to the objects it compares, and the other opposing
the preference map to the feasibility constraints. Neither dichotomy matches the
distinction between ends and means. There is a translation rule to go from the
instrumental language to the preference language, but it does not work the other way
round, as I will now explain.
Suppose that E and E' are an agent's ends, while M and M' are the means available to
this agent. Instrumental reasoning leads to conclusions like the following ones: E can
be reached by means of either M or M', but it is more appropriate to employ M; E'
can be reached again by means of either M or M', but it is more appropriate to
employ M'. To reproduce these conclusions, one introduces a preference map in
which (E,M) is above (E, M'), and (E',M') above (E',M), assuming that each pair is
feasible. More generally, every statement made using the instrumental language can
be re-expressed in the other language. The procedure consists, first, in lumping
together descriptions of the ends and means into states of affairs, and second, in
devising a feasible set of, as well as a preference relation on, these notional states.
The converse translation is not always possible. The preference language makes it
possible to compare (E,M) with (E',M'), i.e., to decide whether it is preferable to
reach some end with some expense of means or to reach another end with another
expense of means. By contrast, instrumental reasoning fixes the end and draws
conclusions relative only to that end. It is unable to extend comparisons to several
ends at a time.
                                                
24 See e.g.: "Economics is neutral as between ends. Economics cannot pronounce on the validity of
ultimate judgments of values" (Robbins, 1932-1935, p. 147). The conflation of "ends" and "values" is
also common in welfare economics, as Sen (1970, p. 62) mentions in passing.
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By saying that the modern preference language is more expressive than the older
instrumental language, I do not exactly make a novel point. However, those who
make it often do not state it at the proper level of abstraction. For instance, Harsanyi
(1976) mentions the availability of continuous trade-offs as a reason why the modern
apparatus supersedes the old. This is irrelevant because even irregular preferences
have a greater expressive power than instrumental categories. However formulated,
the point has apparently escaped the neutrality theorists' notice. Robbins imported the
Weberian recommendation, "Take ends as given", as if it applied to his field as well
as it does to archaeology, and many economists have since followed him
unthinkingly. Even such a basic example as the law of diminishing marginal utility
cannot be discussed in the ends-means language. Nonetheless, neo-classical
economists have felt relief at the Weberian argument about ends and means.
The occasional cases in the field where ends (or objectives) are mentioned as such do
not give much support to an instrumental neutrality claim. The monetarists who
proposed the k% rule as an objective to be achieved by the central banks also
discussed some fallible techniques to approximate it – e.g., to announce the rule
publicly, not to pursue an interest rate objective at the same time, to compensate for
the effect of currency fluctuations. Hence the k% rule provides an example of
instrumental reasoning in economics which is both clear-cut and nontrivial. Does it
support the claim that economists reason only from "ends taken as given"? No.
Inquiries on how to achieve it were just a small part of the monetarists' work. The
latter were mostly concerned with defending the rule itself. Friedman's (1968) basic
argument was that changes in the money stock had an effect on the real economy
only in the short-run; increasing or even accelerating inflation would be the only
remaining long-run effect. This argument involved weighing long-run against short-
run consequences - damages brought about by inflation against benefits ripped from
temporary surges in employment. It was an evaluative argument throughout. It raised
substantial complaints, but nobody objected to it on the formal ground that
economics did not have to pass judgment on policy objectives. This was an important
macroeconomic controversy, and one may be pleased in retrospect that it was not
blocked by pedantry about end-neutrality.25
9. Conclusions
Section 8 completes the argument of section 7 against the weak neutrality thesis, and
by the same token, for the weak non-neutrality thesis. Since these two sections
emphasized the positive-normative distinction, it may be useful to recast the salient
points in the language of judgment. Remember that the two moderate theses conflict
about the containment claim, and the latter says that (i) economics needs relatively
few value judgments; (ii) the value judgments it needs are easy to identify; and (iii)
these judgments can be separated not only logically, but practically, from the
judgments of fact also made. I have argued to the contrary that economists make, and
are justified in making, a large number of value judgments; that some of these are
easy to pinpoint, but others are not; and that judgments of fact and of value often turn
out to be inseparable from each other.
                                                
25 Friedman's (1953) soothing view of neutrality at the beginning of the notorious essay clashes with
his general practice of making recommendations and arguing for them. More on this in Hirsch and de
Marchi (1990).
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This threefold denial of the containment claim was warranted by my examination of
thick predicates and ideal-typical reconstructions of evaluative positions in section 7.
It is surprising that weak neutrality theorists have neglected thick predicates and their
logic, focusing instead on the evaluative good and a few predicates of ethical origin
such as just. The early meta-ethical literature showed a similar unbalance, but the
field has moved on since. In this respect as in others, what contemporary economists
borrow from philosophy proves to be outdated. Concerning ideal-types of the kind I
have singled out, weak neutrality theorists have not paid sufficient attention to their
pervasiveness, nor tried to analyze the peculiar mix of judgments that they tend to
involve. Here at least, they have the excuse of not having much philosophical work
to call to the rescue; little has been written on ideal-types except along orthodox
Weberian lines. The discussion of section 8 about "ends as given" is mostly ad
hominem as it stands. It should be continued by an argument against "preferences as
given", which consists in showing that social, and sometimes even individual
preferences, are to be constructed by the economist, and his value judgments will
naturally come into play at this juncture. I did not spell out the argument because it
would parallel that developed for ideal-typical reconstructions of value positions.
Weak neutrality theorists, like Bergson, Samuelson, and Arrow, all recognized that
value judgments were needed to give the social welfare function a content, but only
Arrow let the economist qua economist carry the task of filling out this content.
Macroeconomists of all persuasions are unknowingly Arrovian. They have been
active in the construction business, and it is fortunate that few of them bothered
about the neutrality principle they violate by doing so.
What remain common to the weak neutrality and non-neutrality theses are the
following substantial claims. Positive economics includes statements that are neither
straightforwardly prescriptive nor logically evaluative, more controversial statements
that do not count as prescriptive or logically evaluative because they are of the
inverted-commas type, and statements that count as such, but for which there is no
evidence that they are sincerely asserted by the economist. The traditional reason for
isolating a core of positive economics is that one would like to compare it with the
available accounts of scientific pursuits. For example, one would like to relate the
law of demand to philosophical definitions of a law of nature, the testing of this law
with that of the more established laws of physics, and so on. My conclusions
preserve these applications, which the strong non-neutrality thesis would destroy. In
a sense, the paper is a prerequisite to standard economic methodology, which takes
the possibility of applying philosophy of science to the field as if it were obvious.
Normative economics includes those statements which are prescriptive or logically
evaluative, and are sincerely asserted by the economist. As in the description of
positive economics, I am writing "includes" instead of "consists of", intending this as
only a sufficient condition for an economic statement to be classified. What does not
satisfy the offered conditions belongs to a buffer area between the positive and
normative departments of economics. Section 7 has exemplified where the division
fails. Returning to the groundwork sections, I can extend the buffer area by including
those logically evaluative statements which are clearly but insincerely asserted by the
economist, and those equivocal statements which can be regarded as neutral only if
one stretches the understanding of the "inverted commas" use.
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To keep the paper within limits, I omitted the topic of interpersonal comparisons of
utility and preference, despite the historical fact that neutrality theorists have often
described them as being evaluative. This view is not as common now as it was in
Robbins's time, and its flaws are perhaps sufficiently clear for the omission to be
excused.26 It is more of a problem that I said nothing about causal attribution as a
way of separating positive from normative reasoning, although both Weber and
Keynes did envisage this demarcation criterion. Given the recent outburst of work on
causality, their argument is not to be taken casually, so I refrained from discussing it.
I also left out the experimental study of the people's normative attitudes, an
intriguing area in which the positive and the normative are intertwined.27 However,
the major absentee is rationality, which simply cannot be handled at a paper's length.
One of the intuitions that turn the scale against neutrality is the pervasiveness of
decision- and game-theoretic arguments in today's economics, an intellectual
phenomenon that the older writers can be excused for not foreshadowing. Despite so
many lacunae, I hope to leave the debate about value judgments and value-neutrality
in a better state than I found it.
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